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Abstract
This article describes a characterisation of competitive market behav-
iour using the concepts of cointegration analysis. It requires all (n) rms
to set prices to follow a single stochastic trend (equivalently the vector of
n prices should have cointegrating rank n  1). This implies that, in the
long run, prices are driven by the shocks that impact on all companies,
ruling out the possibility that the price set by any one rm is weakly
exogenous.
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1 Introduction
In this article we dene statistical criteria for determining competitive behaviour
from the long-run decomposition of prices. Regulatory authorities and rms
have exploited tests of stationarity and cointegration to attempt to determine
non-competitive behaviour (Forni, 2004, London Economics, 2002). Here, tests
for stationary relative prices are seen as a special case of cointegration. When
market prices are su¢ ciently inter-related in the long-run via cointegration, then
the market is viewed as having a broad denition or being more competitive.
We generalize the approach outlined by Hendry and Juselius (2001) to the
case of multi-product price comparisons for a competitive market with n com-
modities. It is assumed that all prices are integrated of the same order. In the
bivariate case competitive behaviour can often be seen as being consistent with
parallel pricing (Buccarossi, 2006 and Forni, 2004) and this proposition might
be appropriately tested by determining whether in their natural logarithm (log)
price proportions are stationary.
Here, n price responses are consistent with competitive behaviour when all
prices are (I(1)), there are n  1 cointegrating relationships or a single common
trend, and the common trend is driven by a combination of shocks to all n
prices. The test of cointegration is a primary test of the proposition that all
series are driven by a single common trend and thus a weighted average of the
price shocks of all rms, but in the multiproduct case this does not imply parallel
pricing (Buccarossi, 2006). Pure parallel pricing only arises when n   1 prices
respond to a single price and this price is then weakly exogenous for the vector
of cointegrating relationships (Johansen, 1992). In the latter case the price set
by one rm denes the stochastic trend and all rms respond to the prices set
by that rm. The price that is weakly exogenous responds only to past values
of that price and more generally to the shocks that apply to that rms price.
In this article, the common stochastic trend is not restricted to being generated
in the above manner.
2 The Stochastic Trend, Long-run Equilibrium
Price Targeting (LEPT) and Cointegration.
Consider a market consisting of n rms. These rms are viewed as being com-
petitive when they all respond to a single common stochastic trend, itself con-
sisting of a linear combination of the vector of shocks to individual rms (t).
This common trend we refer to as an Equilibrium Price Target (EPT) when
each of the rms responds to it in the same way and the relationship between
each rms price and this trend denes a set of restrictions on the n   1 coin-
tegrating relations (), su¢ cient to exactly identify the n  (n   1) matrix of
cointegrating vectors, :1
1We use information that derives from the long-run inter-action of prices, because: we
believe that arbitrage is likely to require rms to respond to the forces of competition, and
this denes an informationaly e¢ cient starting point from which to detect anomalous pricing
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Competitive rms are viewed as correcting their price behaviour in response
to some equilibrium price target. The underlying target to which the com-
petitive rm responds is a weighted average of the vector of all rms prices
x0t =

p1t ::: pnt

and for series that are all I(1) is dened by the non-
stationary component of a single common trend.
Let us consider the case where prices have a pth order Vector Error Correction
form:
 (L)xt = 
0xt 1 + t
where  (L) = I   1L  2L2:::  p 1L2 and we dene   =  (I   1  2::: 
 p 1):The following common trends denition of the equilibrium price target
derives from Theorem 4.2 in Johansen (1995) that gives rise to a cointegrating
rank of n  1.
Denition Let 9 pt where:
pt = w
0xt = w0Cx0 + w0C(
tX
i=1
i + ) (1)
+w0(0) 1
1X
i=0
(I + 0)i0(i + )
Where the price weights are w0 =

w1 ::: wn

; C = ?(
0
? ?)
 10?;
0? = 0; 
0
? = 0; x0 are initial values and  is the drift. Then for pit  I(1);
8 i = 1;   n; Long-run Equilibrium Price Targeting(LEPT) implies that:
pit   pt  I(0):
A case of special interest is where the price weights sum to one (w0 = 1; 0 =
[1; :::; 1]) or prices are homogenous of degree zero. Then:
pit   pt = pit   w0xt
= (w0ji   w0)xt = w0(ji   In)xt:
Where ji is the transpose of the ith unit vector. When (ji  In) = Ri then there
are n cointegrating vectors of the form :i = w
0(ji   In) that are dependent,
when all prices have the same order of integration.
Here we consider a trivariate system2 with w0 =

w1 w2 w3

and:
0n =
24 :1:2
:3
35 =
24 w0R1w0R2
w0R3
35
=
24 w2 + w3  w2  w3 w1 w1 + w3  w3
 w1  w2 w1 + w2
35 ;
behaviour. There are alternative measures of competitive behaviour (for example, Froeb and
Werden, 1998), but they are informationaly burdensome and sensitive to the nature of the
uncertainty (Hunter, Ioannidis, Iossa and Skerratt, 2001).
2The n variable case can be easily imputed from the case where n = 3:
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where
R1 =
24 0 0 01  1 0
1 0  1
35 ; R2 =
24  1 1 00 0 0
0 1  1
35 and R3 =
24  1 0 10  1 1
0 0 0
35 :
As rank(0n) < n we consider n  1 cointegrating vectors:
0 =

11 21 31
12 22 32

=

w2 + w3  w2  w3
 w1 w1 + w3  w3

:
In general the unrestricted cointegrating relationships are not identied. This
is often something ignored by practitioners, but by comparison of the restricted
and unrestricted forms of ; LEPT gives rise to:
r2 = (n  1)2 = (n  1)(n  2) + n  1; (2)
restrictions that are necessary and su¢ cient to identify : Firstly, economic
theory suggests n   1 = 2 price homogeneity restrictions3 that x the rst
column of 0:
11 + 21 + 31 = 0 and 12 + 22 + 32 = 0:
Secondly there are (n  1)(n  2) = 2 restrictions that x n  2 = 1 elements in
the remaining n  1 = 2 rows:
31   32 = 0 and 22   21   1 = 0:
Generic identication (see Burke and Hunter, 2005, Chapter 5) follows, because
LEPT imposes just enough restrictions to satisfy an order condition (2). Now
the formulae above can be used to solve the r2 = 4 equations in terms of n 1 = 2
identied parameters:
32 = 31 =  w3
22 = 21 + 1 = 1  w2
11 =  21   31 = w2 + w3
12 =  22   32 =  21   1  31 = w2 + w3   1 =  w1:
Although, the above criterion are necessary and su¢ cient for generic identica-
tion, for empirical identication we require 21 6= 0 and 31 6= 0:
There are a number of di¤erent ways by which both  and  can be identied,
Burke and Hunter (2005) present a su¢ cient condition for the generic identi-
cation that is implicit in being able to solve for the structural parameters from
a long-run reduced form:
0 =

1 0 31
0 1 32

:
3Notice, that price homogeneity is a long-run property of LEPT. This means that in the
short-run agents may mistake relative and absolute price movements. However, long-run
pricing that does not satisfy this property would not appear to be consistent with competitive
behaviour.
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This parameterization of 0 is termed a Normalization Rule by Boswijk (1996)
and it also implies the imposition of r2 exactly identifying restrictions. Consider,
an orientation that operates on the rst two columns of 0 :
B1;2 =

w2 + w3  w2
 w1 w1 + w3

:
A necessary condition for the long-run reduced form to exist is:
det(B1;2) = det

w2 + w3  w2
 w1 w1 + w3

= (w1 + w2 + w3)w3 6= 0:
However, empirical identication according to Theorem 3 in Boswijk (1996)
implies that identication is not sensitive to the columns selected to generically
identify : This implies for the normalization associated with columns i and j:
0ij =

In 1 B 1i;j b 6=ij

;
for the unrestricted vector of parameters b 6=i;j related to the remaining price.
Were b 6=ij = 0; then one of the prices is long-run excluded and for the case
considered here, when r = n   1 this implies 0ij =

In 1 0

: If r = n   1
then b 6=ij = 0 contradicts the notion that all the series are I(1):
Hence for generic and empirical identication of 0 via the normalization
rule of Boswijk for the trivariate case where i = 1 and j = 2; we require an
ordering such that:
det(Bi;j) = det

11 21
12 22

= 1122   1221 6= 0
and
b 6=ij =

31
32

6= 0:
In our case empirical identication follows when 31 6= 0 and 12 6= 0 and this
is consistent with Theorem 2 and 3 in Boswijk (1996). Firstly, when 31 6= 0;
theorem 2 must hold as:
b06=12 =

31 32

=

31 31
 6= 0:
Secondly, Theorem 3 is satised when det(B1;1) = (w1 + w2 + w3)w3 6= 0
that follows from LEPT as w3 6= 0 when 31 6= 0 and (w1 + w2 + w3) =
 21   31 + 21 + 1 + 31 6= 0:
Notice, that identication may be sensitive to the ordering of the system
and this may occur, because the loadings on the common trend depend on the
impact that shocks to that company price have on the market. Also LEPT
can be linked back to a number of normalized long-run reduced forms, but the
restrictions do not apriori x the long-run to be:
0ij =

In 1  

:
5
Notice, that the form of  given above implies two further over-identifying
restrictions not needed for LEPT, though LEPT might imply them.
To draw out the key aspects of the concept, consider the special case of the
rst order VECM (p = 1) and w = ?; so that C = ?(
0
??)
 10?, 
0
? = 0:
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We can isolate the trend component by multiplying (1) by 0?:
Therefore:
0?xt = 
0
?x0 + 
0
?(
tX
i=1
i + ) = 
0
?
tX
i=1
i;
where the initial condition is set to zero.
From the denition of LEPT, for a broad market5 all series must follow
the same order of integration otherwise di¤erent market segments may re-
spond to di¤erent trends as rank()  n   2: However, this type of relation
is only consistent with competitive behaviour when the cointegrating relations
depend on all prices or we preclude the case where, by any simple re-ordering,
0? 6=

0 0 3?

: More specically the identifying cointegrating combina-
tion negates the possibility that n   1 prices depend exactly on a single price;
this is the case where one of the prices is long-run weakly exogenous and all
prices react to this price. If there are n   1 cointegrating vectors and  is an
n  r matrix of loadings, then it follows from Johansen (1992) for WE of a
variable for the parameters of interest () that a row of  is set to zero. With
rank() = n   1; then only one price can be weakly exogenous as otherwise
rank() < n  1 and there is more than one common trend.
If there is a single common trend, a single weakly exogenous variable and
w = ?; then the following Theorem applies.
Theorem rank() = rank() = n   1 and 0 =  0n 1 0  for some
ordering of the pi; i = 1; :::n, implies a broad market as all prices interact, but
there is non-competitive behaviour as pi for i = 1; :::; n  1 follow pn:
Proof. In general, 0? =

1? 2? ::: n?

and the common trend
drives all prices:
pt = w
0xt = 0?xt = 
0
?x0 + 
0
?(
tX
i=1
i + ):
For WE 0 =

0n 1 0

and with price homogeneity:
0? =

0 0 ::: n?

:
4 In the rst order VECM case when the initial conditions are removed empirically using
a procedure, such as that described by Taylor(1999), then the common trend is a weighted
average of the prices. More generaly, this does not hold though the non-stationarity in the
price series is still driven by 0?(
tX
i=1
i):
5The term broad market is used by Forni(2004) to consider cases where all prices in a
market or market segment interact.
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Therefore:

0 ::: n?
 264 p1t...
pnt
375 = n?pnt = n?pn0 + n?( tX
i=1
ni + n):
6
In the trivariate case under LEPT:
0 =

3? 0  3?
0 3?  3?

and:
0xt =

3? 0  3?
0 3?  3?
24 p1tp2t
p3t
35 =  3?(p1t   p3t)
3?(p2t   p3t)

:
From price homogeneity, 0? = 1 and so 3? = 1: Therefore p

t = pnt and all
prices are driven by the stochastic behaviour that underlies pnt:
When all rms prices are conditioned on pnt; then rm n is the long-run
price leader and LEPT implies:
 =

In 1  n 1

and 0n 1 =

1    1  :
Therefore, we have a broad market in the sense that rms follow the common
trend, but when the common trend is driven by a single rm without reference to
other rms or more pertinently without reference to the direct shocks associated
with miss-pricing by these other rms, then the rm must hold a dominant
position in the market place or that rm must dene the barometer to which all
other rms respond. However, a barometer should not normally behave without
reference to the other rms. It follows, with one price being weakly exogenous
for the parameters of interest, that the nth rms price can be viewed as driving
all the other rms prices. This, we would argue is a form of price leadership as
the long-run is conditioned only on the behaviour of the nth rm price. In this
case, under the restrictions associated with LEPT all rms respond to those of
the nth rm, but in the long-run the nth rm does not respond to any of the
other rms prices. Hence, although there are n  1 long-run price relations and
 satises the restrictions this is not a competitive case. Hence, for competitive
behaviour, we have a further requirement that the common trend is not dened
by a single rms price or that none of the prices are weakly exogenous for .
A number of side issues arise from rank() < n   1, there being at least
two common trends. Firstly, individual prices may follow linear combinations
of the common trends that happen to be di¤erent. In this case, one trend may
eventually come to dominate. Secondly, the market may be partitioned, so a
6 In the case of the pth order VECM:
pt = w0xt = 0?xt = 
0
?x0 + e0?( tX
i=1
i + ) and e = 0??(0? ?) 1:
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block of rms follow one price and another group responds to one or both prices,
the latter case occurs when we have cointegrating exogeneity (Hunter, 1990). If
they follow di¤erent linear combinations of the common trends, this may not be
consistent with equilibrium in the very long-run as such a divergence of prices
is likely in the end to imply death or dominance.
3 Conclusion
In this article we considered the conditions required for competitive behaviour
using cointegration analysis. We argue that pricing is consistent with com-
petitive behaviour when: i) there are n   1 cointegrating relationships, ii) the
restrictions associated with LEPT are satised, iii) non of the price series are
WE. Beyond the bivariate case the restrictions associated with LEPT are not
in general simple price or log price di¤erentials often applied in the literature.
This has the implication that tests of stationarity on the price di¤erentials in
an n > 2 system will not be appropriate.
It is also feasible to extend this analysis to the multi-product case via panel
cointegration, allow for shifting short-run dynamics (Kurita and Nielsen, 2005)
and long memory processes with fractional cointegration (Robinson, 2006).
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